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Abstract
We consider the problem of technology transfer. We specically
treat a technology such that an adoption of the technology by a player
increases the other players' payos but may decrease the adopter's own
payo. The technology is transferred through negotiations. The prop-
erty of the technology gives players the incentive to deviate from the
negotiation for free-riding on the other players' adoptions. We formu-
late this situation by the theory of social situations and investigate
whether full diusion is possible provided that full diusion achieves
the social optimum. We show that full diusion is always achieved
in the initial negotiation when renegotiations are allowed after imple-
menting an agreement, whereas full diusion may fail to be achieved
if no such renegotiation is allowed.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of technology transfer through negotiations. A
technology is a kind of information. A distinguishing feature of information
as a commodity is its irreversibility. One player can transfer information
while retaining the information he has because the player can replicate the
information either without cost or with a negligible cost. Specically, we
treat a technology where adoption by one player benets the others. Typical
examples include water purication technology for an open-access water re-
source and technology for reducing pollution emission abatement costs. More
generally, cost reduction technology for a public good with dierentiated cost
is also an example. We examine whether full diusion is possible provided
that full diusion achieves the social optimum.
We will refer to such a technology as a technology with positive externali-
ties (henceforth, TPE). Many studies have pointed out that the adoption of a
TPE may not serve the adopting player's own interest. Buchholz and Konrad
(1994) considered an international pollution emission reduction model where
each player strategically chooses his emission reduction technology prior to
the noncooperative or cooperative emission reduction decisions. They showed
that there are incentives for the players to choose higher-cost technologies
in both cases. Lee (2001) considered a two-country model of the pollution
emission reduction technology transfer. He showed that the recipient's wel-
fare may decrease even if a simultaneous income transfer is allowed. Cornes
and Hartley (2007) showed that in a voluntary provision game of a public
good with dierentiated unit costs, a player's payo at a Nash equilibrium
may decrease when his own unit cost is reduced.
Furthermore, there may involve an additional cost for installing the TPE,
even if the TPE adoption itself benets the recipient. Some examples are
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given by Jae et al. (2005): the cost to learn the new technology, the cost
to purchase new equipment, and the cost to adapt the new technology to
their own circumstances. Strunland (1996) showed that the existence of such
costs may prevent technology transfer in a two-country model even though
the technology transfer itself is Pareto-improving.
The payo structure of the TPE transfer is summarized as follows. First,
an adoption of the TPE by one player increases the other players' payos.
Second, an adoption of the TPE may decrease the adopting player's own
payo. Therefore, our model includes a typical social conict along the lines
of the prisoners' dilemma and the game of chicken. Further, we will allow
side payments that will be described as the monetary transfer. Under such
a payo structure, we consider the following TPE transfer process. The
TPE is originally held by only one player. Agents, including the original
holder, form a coalition and negotiate cooperatively for the TPE and the
monetary transfer. Despite the optimality of full diusion, players may nd
it preferable to refuse the technology and monetary transfers and free-ride on
the benets generated by the other players' adoptions. Then, such a player
will deviate from the negotiation, and full diusion may not be sustained.
To formulate such a situation, we need to consider a hybrid model that
incorporates both the (cooperative) coalitional negotiations and (noncoop-
erative) deviations for free-riding. In the coalitional negotiations, players
are allowed to deviate from the negotiation by starting another negotiation
by a subcoalition. This kind of deviation is just like a standard deviation
in coalitional games. Additionally, players are allowed to deviate from the
negotiation for free-riding on the other players' adoptions. Several studies
have investigated models incorporating both cooperative and noncooperative
behavior. Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) considered the international envi-
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ronmental agreement model. An agreement is dened by a coalition, where
participants can transfer money within it. They also allow the players to
deviate noncooperatively from the coalition to free-ride the remaining play-
ers' eorts for the environment. Furusawa and Konishi (2011) dened the
free-riding proof core for a public good economy. The free-riding proof core
requires the robustness not only to the standard coalitional improvement,
but also to noncooperative deviations from contributing for a public good for
free-riding. Both models exogenously assume cooperation in the remaining
coalition after a (noncooperative) free-riding deviation. However, remain-
ing players also behave for their own interest. It should be considered what
happens in the negotiation held by the remaining players. Furusawa and
Konishi (2011) required that the coalitional improvement be achieved with
an allocation that is credible in the sense of Ray (1989). We also impose this
requirement.
To capture such a negotiation process, we formulate our model by the the-
ory of social situations (Greenberg, 1990). We employ the optimistic stable
standard of behavior (henceforth, OSSB) as the solution concept. Greenberg
(1990) argued that the OSSB is an acceptable recommendation for ratio-
nal players. In this sense, our main purpose is as follows: whether the full
diusion of the TPE is acceptable for the players at all.
We rst consider a situation where the standard coalitional deviations
and the free-riding deviations are allowed. In this model, the OSSB may
not include the full diusion. We next consider a situation where the play-
ers are additionally allowed to renegotiate after reaching an agreement and
implementing the agreement. Then, the result is drastically changed, and
the OSSB always includes the full diusion of the TPE. Indeed, the OSSB
recommends that the full diusion be achieved in the initial negotiation.
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Therefore, the possibility of renegotiations after implementing an agree-
ment plays an important role. Similar concepts of renegotiation have been
employed in the literature. Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) considered rene-
gotiations among participating and nonparticipating players concerning the
international environmental agreement, where participating players commit
themselves not to deviate from the agreement afterward. Gomes (2005) em-
ployed a similar renegotiation concept in the game of coalitional multilateral
contracts with externalities.1 In his model, players form a coalition and write
a contract within the coalition. After writing a contract in each coalition,
some coalitions merge, and the merged coalitions can rewrite the contract if
all the members agree. In these studies, the coalitions sequentially expand
in general, and the grand coalition is eventually formed after a nite number
of commitments. In contrast, in the persent paper, the full diusion of the
TPE is always acceptable for players in the initial negotiation.
Another related study is Muto and Nakayama (1994), who also employ
the theory of social situations to investigate the trade of information where
resales are freely allowed. They addressed an information with negative
externalities such as the cost reduction technology in a Cournot market.
They showed that if the initial trade is appropriate, then no further resale by
new holders takes place and the initial holder can retain its benet despite
the fact that resales are possible. They called such a trade the resale-proof
trade, which was originally dened by Nakayama et al. (1991).2 Our problem
is a kind of inverse problem of the resale-proofness in the following sense. The
full diusion may be intuitively prevented since recipients of the TPE may
1Other multilateral contracts models including renegotiations after a commitments has
been considered by Seidmann and Winter (1998), Okada (2000), and Gomes and Jehiel
(2005).
2See also Muto (1986, 1990) and Nakayama and Quintas (1991).
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have incentives to deviate from the negotiation even though the full diusion
is ecient. Our analysis shows that the possibility of renegotiations after
implementing agreements, which corresponds to the possibility of resales in
Muto and Nakayama (1994), makes the full diusion of the TPE acceptable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
briey introduce the theory of social situations. In section 3, we dene a
model of TPE transfer where standard coalitional deviations and the free-
riding deviation are allowed and show that full diusion may not be achieved.
In section 4, we dene a model of TPE transfer that allows renegotiations
after agreements are implemented. The main result of this paper is stated
in this section. The proof of the main theorem is relegated to the Appendix.
In the nal section, we conclude with some remarks.
2 Theory of social situations
We briey introduce the theory of social situations established by Greenberg
(1990). The framework in the theory of social situations is a situation that
is a tuple (; ), where  is an inducement correspondence and   is a set
of positions. A position is a triple G = (N(G); X(G); (ui(G))i2N(G)), where
N(G) is the set of players at G, X(G) is the feasible outcomes at G, and
ui(G) is the payo function of player i 2 N(G) at G.
The inducement correspondence is a mapping  that assigns (SjG; x) 
  for any G 2  , S  N(G), and x 2 X(G). An alternative position
G0 2 (SjG; x) is a position that is inducible from G via S when x is taken
as an outcome. A situation requires that   be closed under . For a situation
(; ), a mapping  that assigns (G)  X(G) for any G 2   is said to be
a standard of behavior (henceforth, SB). The purpose of the theory of social
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situations is to investigate the stability of the SB.3
Denition 1 An SB  for a situation (; ) is said to be an optimistic stable
standard of behavior (henceforth, OSSB) i  satises the following.
The optimistic internal stability For all G 2  , x 2 (G) implies that
there do not exist S  N(G), H 2 (SjG; x), and y 2 (H) such that
ui(H)(y) > ui(G)(x) for all i 2 S.
The optimistic external stability For all G 2  , x 2 X(G) n (G) im-
plies that there exist S  N(G), H 2  (SjG; x), and y 2 (H) such
that ui(H)(y) > ui(G)(x) for all i 2 S.
Let  be an SB in (; ) and G 2  . The optimistic dominion of G
relative to  via T  N(G) is dened by
ODOMT (;G) =

x 2 X(G)
 9H 2 (T jG; x);9y 2 (H);ui(H)(y) > ui(G)(x);8i 2 T

:
Then, the optimistic dominion of G relative to  is dened by
ODOM(;G) =
[
TN(G)
ODOMT (;G):
Remark 1 We can restate the denitions of the optimistic stability in terms
of the optimistic dominion of G as follows (see Greenberg, 1990). Let  be
an SB for a situation (; ). Then,
  satises the optimistic internal stability if and only if (G)  X(G)n
ODOM(;G) for all G 2  ;
  satises the optimistic external stability if and only if (G)  X(G)n
ODOM(;G) for all G 2  ;
3We omit the denition of the conservative stability of the SB, which is an another
stability concept in the theory of social situations. See Greenberg (1990) for details.
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  is an OSSB if and only if (G) = X(G)nODOM(;G) for all G 2  .
The last restatement will play an important role in the proof of the main
results.
In general, a situation may admit no OSSB or multiple OSSB. Greenberg
(1990) showed that if a situation is hierarchical, the OSSB uniquely exists.
Denition 2 A situation (; ) is said to be hierarchical i
(a) there exists a nite partition f 1; :::; kg of   such that for all h = 1; :::; k
and any G 2  h,
 
; fGg [  Sh+1hk  h is a situation, and
(b) for any G 2  , there exists at most one S  N(G) such that G 2
(SjG; x) for some x 2 X(G).
3 The TPE transfer situation
Let N = f1; :::; ng (n  2) be the set of players. A nonempty subset of N
is called a coalition. Let N = fT  N jT 6= ;g be the set of coalitions. For
each coalition S, let N (S) = fT 2 NjT \S 6= ;g be the set of coalitions each
of which has a nonempty intersection with S. For each coalition S 2 N , let
jSj denote the cardinality of S.
We consider a situation where a technology is transferred among the
players. We say this technology is a technology with positive externalities
(TPE) in the sense that an additional TPE transfer to a player benets the
other players. This technology is initially held by one player, say, player 1. A
transfer of the TPE may involve monetary transfers. These can include the
expense of the TPE (i.e., from the recipient to the donor) and the subsidy
for adopting the TPE (i.e., from the donor to the recipient). We say an
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n-dimensional vector x is a transfer vector if
P
i2N xi = 0. Let Rn0 denote
the set of transfer vectors. For each x 2 Rn0 and i 2 N , xi > 0 means that
player i receives an amount of money xi, and xi < 0 means that player i pays
an amount of money  xi.
The state, which describes (i) the holder(s) of the TPE and (ii) the mon-
etary transfer, is dened by a coalition S 2 N (f1g) and a monetary transfer
vector z 2 Rn0 . Therefore, the set of states is dened by
 = N (f1g) Rn0 :
A special state is the initial state, where the TPE has not been transferred
yet and no monetary transfer has taken place. The initial state is dened by
 = (f1g; 0; :::; 0). For simplicity, we identify the phrase \adopting the TPE"
with the phrase \the TPE is transferred". Therefore, given a state (S; z), S
is the set of players who have adopted the TPE as well as the set of players
who have transferred the TPE.
For each i 2 N and S 2 N (f1g), fi(S) denes the payo of i when
the TPE is diused among the members in S. Assume that fi measures
the payo in terms of money for each i 2 N . We will be able to represent
the total payo in a quasi-linear form: for each i 2 N , the payo function
ui : ! R is dened as ui(S; z) = fi(S) + zi for any (S; z) 2 . We assume
the following conditions on fi for each i 2 N .
Assumption 1 (a) For each i 2 N , fi(S) < fi(T ) for all S; T 2 N (f1g)
with S ( T and either i 2 S or i =2 T .
(b)
P
i2N fi(N) >
P
i2N fi(S) for all S 2 N (f1g) n fNg.
Assumption 1(a) represents the positive externalities of the technology. As-
sumption 1(b) requires the full diusion of the TPE be socially optimum.
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Assumption 1 does not exclude the possibility that the adoption of the TPE
may decrease the adopter's own payo; e.g., for each S 2 N (f1g) and i =2 S,
it may be fi(S) > fi(S [ fig). This may be caused by the eect of the
technological change through the interactions among players (Buchholz and
Konrad, 1994; Lee, 2001; Cornes and Hartley, 2007) or some cost of imple-
menting the TPE (Strunland, 1996; Jae et al., 2005).
A state (S; z) is said to be
 individually rational i fi(S) + zi  fi(f1g) for all i 2 N ;
 (weakly) Pareto ecient i there exists no (S 0; z0) 2  such that
fi(S
0) + z0i > fi(S) + zi for all i 2 N ;
 a full diusion state i S = N .
Note that a state is a full diusion state if and only if it is Pareto ecient
by Assumption 1(b).
Now, we dene the TPE transfer situation.
Denition 3 Let   = fG(T ) jT 2 N (f1g)g be the set of positions, where
for all T 2 N (f1g),
N(G(T )) = T;
X(G(T )) = f(R; x) 2 j1 2 R  T; xi = 0;8i 2 N n Tg;
ui(G(T )) = ui for all i 2 N;
and let  be the inducement correspondence such that
(QjG(T ); (R; x)) =
8><>:
fG(Q)g if Q 2 N (f1g); Q  T ;
fG(T nQ)g if Q  T n f1g;
; otherwise
for each T 2 N (f1g) and (R; x) 2 X(G(T )). Then the situation (; ) is
said to be a TPE transfer (henceforce, TPET) situation.
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Note that (R; x) 2 X(G(T )) implies that Pi2T xi = 0 for all T 2 N (f1g).
The TPET situation describes the following process. Let T 2 N (f1g). At
position G(T ), the players in T negotiate the TPE transfer and the monetary
transfer within T . The states available in this negotiation are denoted by
X(G(T )). Note that X(G(T )) includes the states where some players in T
are excluded from the TPE transfer and the states where some players are
involved only in the monetary transfer. It might seem strange, but we allow
such kinds of transfers by following the spirit of the theory of social situations
expressed by Greenberg (1990, p.10) \An outcome is a feasible alternative; it
need not be a `predicted,' `reasonable,' or `rational' alternative." Of course,
there is a possibility of no transfer, which is indicated by the initial state .
Once a state (R; z) is proposed at G(T ), the inducement correspondence
 allows the following two kinds of deviations. First, a coalition Q with
1 2 Q  T is allowed to deviate and renegotiate by itself. This deviation
would be successful if Q can agree on a more preferable state. This deviation
examines whether (R; z) is a robust agreement within T against the standard
notion of deviations in the coalitional game. Second, a coalition Q  T n f1g
is allowed to deviate from (R; z) by refusing any technology and monetary
transfer and to leave the negotiation. This deviation would be successful
if Q nds it preferable to leave the negotiation and enjoy the benet from
the resulting state in the negotiation by T n Q. Therefore, this deviation
examines whether players keep participating in the negotiation.
We show that the TPET situation has the following property.
Proposition 1 The TPET situation admits the unique OSSB.
Proof. Let (; ) be a TPET situation. It suces to show that (; ) is
hierarchical as mentioned in Section 2. For each k = 1; :::; n, dene
 k = fG(T ) 2  j jT j = n  k + 1g:
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Obviously, ( 1; :::; n) is a partition of  . We show that this partition satises
Denition 2(a).
Fix an arbitrary G 2  . Let k = 1; :::; n such that G 2  k. Then, there
exists some T 2 N (f1g) such that G = G(T ). Note that k = n jT j+1. Fix
an arbitrary G 2 fG(T )g [Skhn  h. Then, there exists some R 2 N (f1g)
such that G = G(R) and either R = T or jRj < jT j. For any (R0; x) 2
X(G(R)), (QjG(R); (R0; x)) 6= ; implies Q  R n f1g or Q 2 N (f1g) with
Q  R.
First, assume Q  R n f1g. Then, (QjG(R); (R0; x)) = fG(R n Q)g for
any (R0; x) 2 X(G(R)). By jR n Qj < jRj, G(R n Q) 2 Skhn+1  h. Next,
assume Q 2 N (f1g) with Q  R. Then, (QjG(R); (R0; x)) = fG(Q)g for
any (R0; x) 2 X(G(R)). By Q = R or jQj < jRj, either G(Q) = G(R) or
G(Q) 2 Skhn+1  h. Hence  ; fGg [Sk+1hn+1  h is a situation.
Denition 2(b) immediately follows from the denition of , since for all
S 2 N (f1g) and any (S 0; x) 2 X(G(S)), G(S) 2 (QjG(S); (S 0; x)) implies
Q = S. Hence (; ) is hierarchical and admits the unique OSSB. 
Despite the fact that Proposition 1 assures the existence and the unique-
ness of the OSSB, it is dicult to characterize the OSSB for the TPET
situation completely. Indeed, it is more dicult than for the more complex
model that appears in the later section. We restrict our attention to showing
that full diusion may fail to be achieved in the OSSB of the TPET situation.
To this end, we consider the following simple situation.
Example 1 This example is the lake of Shapley and Shubik (1969) with
a reinterpretation and a restricted assumption. There are n( 3) factories
operating with a lake (an open-access water resource). Each rm discharges
water after operation. The water discharge of each factory pollutes the lake
except for that of factory 1, which has an environmentally sound technology.
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We treat the environmentally sound technology as the TPE. If a factory
adopts the TPE, then the factory no longer pollutes the lake, but it must
bear B > 0 of the installation cost. When k factories have not adopted
the technology, each rm must purify the water with cost kD > 0 before
operation. Assume that 2D < B < 3D. Once the environmentally sound
technology is diused among the members in S 2 N (f1g), the payo of each
factory is
fi(S) =
(
 (n  jSj)D if i 2 f1g [ (N n S);
 (n  jSj)D  B if i 2 S: (1)
It can be easily conrmed that this example meets Assumption 1. Note that
fi further satises fi(S) > fi(S [ fig) for all i 2 N and all S 2 N (f1g) with
i =2 S. 
In Example 1, the following proposition follows.4
Proposition 2 Let  be the OSSB for a TPET situation (; ) dened by
Example 1. Let T 2 N (f1g). Then, (G(N)) 6= ; if and only if n is odd.
Formally,
(a) If jT j  2, then (G(T )) = fg.
(b) If jT j > 2 and jT j is odd, then there exists some (T; x) 2 X(G(T )) such
that (T; x) 2 (G(T )).
(c) If jT j > 2 and jT j is even, then (G(T )) = ;.
Preceding the proof of Proposition 2, we prove a lemma.
4Such a \rotational" outcome frequently appears in the social dilemma situation formu-
lated by the theory of social situations. See for example, Masuzawa (2005) and Nakanishi
(2009).
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Lemma 1 Let (; ) be a TPET situation dened by Example 1. Let S 2
N (f1g) with jSj > 1.
(a) There exists no (S; x) 2 X(G(S)) satisfying both f1(S) + x1  f1(f1g)
and fi(S) + xi  fi(S n fig) for all i 2 S n f1g.
(b) Let R 2 N (f1g) with R ( S. Then, Pi2S fi(S) > Pi2S fi(R) if and
only if jSj  3.
Proof. Let (; ) be a TPET situation dened by Example 1. Let S 2
N (f1g) with jSj > 1. For notational simplicity, let s = jSj.
(a) Suppose that there exists some (S; x) 2 X(G(S)) such that f1(S) +
x1  f1(f1g) and fi(S) + xi  fi(S n fig) for all i 2 S n f1g. Aggregating
these inequalities over S,X
i2S
fi(S) =
X
i2S
(fi(S) + xi)  f1(f1g) +
X
i2Snf1g
fi(S n fig) (2)
by
P
i2S xi = 0. On the other hand, by (1)X
i2S
fi(S) =  s(n  s)D   (s  1)B;
f1(f1g) +
X
i2Snf1g
fi(S n fig) =  (n  1)D + (s  1)( (n  s+ 1)D)
=  s(n  s)D   2(s  1)D:
This contradicts (2) by 2D < B.
(b) Fix an arbitrary R 2 N (f1g) with R ( S. Denote r = jRj. By (1),X
i2S
fi(S) 
X
i2S
fi(R) = [ s(n  s)D   (s  1)B]
  [ s(n  r)D   (r   1)B]
= (s  r)sD   (s  r)B
= (s  r)(sD  B)
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By s > r and 2D < B < 3D, (s  r)(sD  B) > 0 if and only if s  3. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let  be the OSSB of a TPET situation (; )
dened by Example 1. Fix an arbitrary T 2 N (f1g). The proof proceeds by
a mathematical induction on jT j. We rst show (a). Then, we show (b) and
(c) assuming the proof is done for all T 0 ( T .
(a) It can be easily conrmed that (G(f1g)) = fg since X(G(f1g)) =
fg, (f1gjG(f1g); ) = fG(f1g)g, and (QjG(f1g); ) = ; for all Q 6= f1g.
Let T = f1; ig, where i 2 N n f1g. Fix an arbitrary (R; x) 2 X(G(T )) with
(R; x) 6= . Then, either f1(R) + x1 < f1(f1g) or fi(R) + xi < fi(f1g) by
Lemma 1(a). Thus, (R; x) 2 ODOM(;G(T )) since (G(f1g)) = fg and
G(f1g) 2 (f1gjG(T ); (R; x))\(figjG(T ); (R; x)). Hence fg  X(G(T ))n
ODOM(;G(T )) = (G(T )). Then, it follows that  =2 ODOM(;G(T ))
from (G(f1g)) = fg and fg  (G(T )). Hence (G(T )) = fg.
(b) Assume that jT j > 2 and jT j is odd. Denote t = jT j. Assume that the
proof is done for all T 0 ( T . Dene x1 = (t  1)(2D   B) and xi = B   2D
for each i 2 T n f1g. Then,
fi(T ) + xi =  (n  t)D  B + (B   2D)
=  (n  (t  2))D
(3)
for all i 2 T n f1g. For each R 2 N (f1g) with R  T and r = jRj,X
i2R
(fi(T ) + xi) 
X
i2R
fi(R)
= [r( (n  t)D)  (r   1)B + (t  r)(2D  B)]
  [r( (n  r))D   (r   1)B]
= r(t  r)D + (t  r)(2D  B)
= (t  r)((r + 2)D  B)
 0
(4)
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by B < 3D.
We claim that (T; x) =2 ODOM(;G(T )). First, we show that (T; x) =2
ODOMT (;G(T )). If there exists some (R; y) 2 X(G(T )) such that fi(R)+
yi > fi(T ) + xi for all i 2 T , then
P
i2T fi(R) >
P
i2T fi(T ) by
P
i2T xi =P
i2T yi = 0. This contradicts Lemma 1(b) by jT j  3. Thus, (T; x) =2
ODOMT (;G(T )).
Next, x an arbitrary Q 2 N (f1g) with Q ( T . We begin with the case
where jQj = 1, 2 or jT j   1. Then, (G(Q)) = ; or (G(Q)) = fg by
the induction hypothesis. Thus, (T; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) since fG(Q)g =
(QjG(T ); (T; x)) and f1(T ) + x1  f1(f1g). Then, consider the case where
3  jQj < jT j   1. Suppose that there exists some (Q0; y0) 2 X(G(Q)) such
that fi(Q
0) + y0i > fi(T ) + xi for all i 2 Q. Then,X
i2Q
fi(Q) 
X
i2Q
fi(Q
0) >
X
i2Q
(fi(T ) + xi)
by jQj  3, Lemma 1(b), and Pi2Q y0i = 0. This contradicts (4). Therefore,
(T; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )).
Finally, x an arbitrary P  T n f1g. First, assume that jP j = 1. Then,
(G(T n P )) = ; or (G(T n P )) = fg by the induction hypothesis, where
the latter holds only if jT j = 3. Thus, (T; x) =2 ODOMP (;G(T )) since
fG(T n P )g = (P jG(T ); (T; x)) and
fi(T ) + xi =  (n  jT j+ 2)D   (n  1)D = fi(f1g)
for all i 2 T n f1g by jT j  3 and (3). Next, assume that jP j > 1. For any
(P 0; z0) 2 X(G(TnP )), jP 0j  jTnP j  jT j 2. For any (P 0; z0) 2 X(G(TnP ))
and all i 2 P ,
fi(P
0)  fi(T n P )   (n  (jT j   2))D = fi(T ) + xi
by the choice of (T; x) and (3). Thus, (T; x) =2 ODOMP (;G(T )).
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Hence (T; x) 2 X(G(T )) nODOM(;G(T )) = (G(T )).
(c) Assume that jT j > 2 and jT j is even. Assume that the proof is
done for all T 0 ( T . Fix an arbitrary (R; x) 2 X(G(T )). Suppose that
f1(R) + x1  f1(f1g) and fi(R) + xi  fi(T n fig) for all i 2 T n f1g.
Aggregating these inequalities over T ,X
i2T
fi(T ) 
X
i2T
fi(R)  f1(f1g) +
X
i2Tnf1g
fi(T n fig)
by
P
i2T xi = 0 and Lemma 1(b). Then, there exists some (xi)i2T such
that
P
i2T xi = 0, f1(T ) + x1  f1(f1g), and fi(T ) + xi  fi(T n fig) for all
i 2 T nf1g. This contradicts Lemma 1(a). Hence either f1(R)+x1 < f1(f1g)
or there exists some k 2 T n f1g with fk(R) + xk < fk(T n fkg).
If the former holds, then (R; x) 2 ODOMf1g(;G(T )) by G(f1g) 2
(f1gjG(T ); (R; x)) and (G(f1g)) = fg. If the latter holds, then (R; x) 2
ODOMfkg(;G(T )) sinceG(T nfkg) 2 (fkgjG(T ); (R; x)) and (T nfkg; y) 2
(G(T n fkg)) for some y 2 Rn0 by the induction hypothesis. Hence (R; x) 2
ODOM(;G(T )). 
4 Renegotiations after implementing agree-
ments
In this section, we dene the TPET-RIA situation, which is similar to the
TPET situation but allows renegotiations after implementing agreements. In
the TPET situation, coalitions may deviate from a negotiation before reach-
ing an agreement at the negotiation. The TPET-RIA situation additionally
allows coalitions to start new negotiations after an agreement is reached in
the current negotiation and is implemented. We introduce the formal deni-
tion of the TPET-RIA situation.
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Denition 4 Let   =

G(S;z)(T ) j(S; z) 2 ; T 2 N (S)	 be the set of posi-
tions, where for any  = (S; z) 2  and T 2 N (S),
N(G(T )) = N;
X(G(T )) =

(R; x) 2 
 S  R  S [ T;xi = zi;8i 2 N n T;

;
ui(G
(T )) = ui for all i 2 N:
Let  be the inducement correspondence that is dened by the following two
steps. First, for each Q 2 N ,  = (S; z) 2 , T 2 N (S), and (R; x) 2
X(G(T )), dene
0(QjG(T ); (R; x)) =
8><>:

G(Q)
	
if S \Q 6= ;; Q  T ;
fG(T nQ)g if Q  T n S;
; otherwise.
Next, for each Q 2 N ,  = (S; z) 2 , T 2 N (S), and (R; x) 2 X(G(T )),
dene
(QjG(T ); (R; x))
=
(
0(QjG(T ); (R; x)) [ fG(R;x)(Q)g if Q  T; (R; x) 6= ;
0(QjG(T ); (R; x)) otherwise,
Then, a situation (;  ) is said to be a TPE transfer with renegotiations after
implementing an agreement (henceforth, TPET-RIA) situation.
Note that for any G(S;z)(T ) 2  , (R; x) 2 X(G(T )) implies Pi2T zi =P
i2T xi.
The TPET-RIA situation describes the following process. Consider that
a state  = (S; z) 2  is actually achieved, and T 2 N with S \ T 6= ; is
participating in a negotiation denoted by a position G(T ). Note that S, the
current TPE holders, will keep holding the TPE by its irreversibility, even
18
if one is not participating in a current negotiation. Note also that at least
one current TPE holder must be included in the negotiation for the TPE
transfer. In the same manner as the TPET situation, the states available
in this negotiation are dened by X(G(T )). In this sense, X(G(T )) is a
natural extension of X(G(T )), which appeared in Section 3. The situation
starts with G
(N), the initial state and a negotiation among all players.
Consider that a state (R; z) is once proposed at G(T ). Two kinds of de-
viations dened in the TPET situation are naturally extended to the TPET-
RIA situation dened in 0. These kinds of deviations are done before reach-
ing or implementing an agreement. In addition to these, one more kind
of deviation is allowed. The players in T , who are the participants in the
current negotiation, agree on (R; z) and start an another negotiation after
implementing (R; z). This new kind of deviation is conducted by a superset
Q of T . Namely, the players in T must be included in Q since they are
required to agree and actually achieve (R; z); additionally, the players in T
are allowed to invite the players outside T , and the invited players partici-
pate the new negotiation if they accept the invitation. We call this process
a renegotiation after implementing an agreement.
Two remarks on the renegotiation after implementing an agreement fol-
low. First, when a negotiation concludes without any TPE and monetary
transfer, i.e.  appears as a result at G(T ), we regard it as an agreement to
stop any further TPE and monetary transfer. Therefore, we do not consider
the renegotiation after implementing . Second, unlike the TPET situa-
tion, the players not participating in a negotiation, N(G(T )) n T = N n T ,
are involved in the position G(T ). The players in N n T are regarded as
just waiting for a possible invitation for renegotiation after implementing an
agreement, and they do not voluntarily return to the negotiation without
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this invitation.
Note that we allow negotiations held by a coalition without the original
holder. In this sense, we are assuming that it is allowed to transfer the
TPE without the permission of the original holder. This may happen by the
incomplete intellectual property right (henceforth, IPR) protection for the
TPE. For example, the original holder (player 1) renounces the intellectual
property right, or some illegal imitations are overlooked.
Unfortunately, in contrast to the TPET situation, the TPET-RIA situa-
tion is never hierarchical.
Proposition 3 The TPET-RIA situation (;  ) is not hierarchical.
Proof. Let (;  ) be a TPET-RIA situation. Fix an arbitrary (S; x) 2 .
Fix an arbitrary T 2 N (S) with jT j  2. By jT j  2, we can choose some
(S; y) 2 X(G(S;x)(T )) with x 6= y. Note that xi = yi for all i 2 N n T .
Thus, G(S;y)(T ) 2 (T jG(S;x)(T ); (S; y)). By xi = yi for all i 2 N n T ,
(S; x) 2 X(G(S;y)(T )). By x 6= y, G(S;x)(T ) 2 (T jG(S;y)(T ); (S; x)).
Now, x an arbitrary partition P ( ) =
 
 k
m
k=1
. Let k and k0 be integers
such that G(S;x)(T ) 2  k and G(S;y)(T ) 2  k0 , respectively. If k  k0, then
P ( ) does not satisfy Denition 2(a) by G(S;y)(T ) 2 (T jG(S;x)(T ); (S; x)).
On the other hand, if k < k0, then P ( ) does not satisfy Denition 2(a) by
G(S;x)(T ) 2 (T jG(S;y)(T ); (S; y)). 
We can, however, prove the existence and uniqueness of the OSSB for a
TPET-RIA situation. The main result of this paper is stated by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 There exists the unique OSSB  that assigns the set of individ-
ually rational full diusion states at the initial negotiation G
(N), i.e.
(G
(N)) =

(N; x) 2 X(G(T )) j fi(N) + xi  fi(f1g); 8i 2 N
	
. (5)
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Formally, for any  = (S; z) 2  and T 2 N with S \ T 6= ;,
(a) if S = N , then (G(T )) = f(N; z)g;
(b) if S 6= N and S [ T 6= N , then (G(T )) = f(S; z)g;
(c) if S 6= N , S [ T = N , and Pi2T fi(N) Pi2T fi(S), then
(G(T )) = f(N; x) 2 X(G(T ))j fi(N) + xi = fi(S) + zi;8i 2 Tg
[ f(S; z)g;
(d) if S 6= N , S [ T = N , Pi2T fi(N) >Pi2T fi(S), and jS \ T j = 1, then
(G(T )) =

(N; x) 2 X(G(T )) j fi(N) + xi  fi(S) + zi;8i 2 T
	
;
(e) if S 6= N , S [ T = N , Pi2T fi(N) >Pi2T fi(S), and jS \ T j > 1, then
(G(T )) =

(N; x) 2 X(G(T ))
 xi  zi; 8i 2 S \ T ;fi(N) + xi  fi(S) + zi;8i 2 T

.
The proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to the Appendix.
Remark 2 The SB  dened by Theorem 1(a)-(e) is nonempty for any po-
sition. The nonemptiness of (G(T )) is obvious for (a)-(c), follows from
Assumption 1(b) for (d), and follows from Lemma 2 in the Appendix for (e).
Remark 3 In this section, we remarked that we are assuming the incom-
plete protection of the IPR. If the IPR is completely protected, the TPE
cannot be transferred without permission from the original holder (player 1);
that is, any negotiating coalition must include player 1. We can obtain a
similar result with Theorem 1 in this alternative model. Indeed, the most
important result of this paper remains unchanged; that is, the OSSB assigns
the individually rational full diusion states in the initial negotiation. The
proof of Theorem 1 applies to this case with slight modications. In this
sense, whether the IPR is completely protected or not is not a large matter
here.
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5 Concluding remarks
We consider TPE transfer problems by employing the theory of social sit-
uations. In the TPET situation, it is shown that full diusion may not be
acceptable for the players in the OSSB. On the other hand, full diusion
is always acceptable for the players in the OSSB for the TPET-RIA situa-
tion. Moreover, the OSSB recommends achieving the individually rational
full diusion state in the initial negotiation. Two remarks are in order.
First, the OSSB for the TPET-RIA situation says nothing about how to
share the prot from the TPE diusion since the OSSB assigns all the Pareto
ecient and individually rational states at the initial negotiation. A further
analysis of the prot-sharing problem may be necessary.
Second, there are some directions in which the model of this paper can be
extended. For example, we may consider the case where there are multiple
TPEs held by some players. Moreover, the players may have options to inno-
vate the TPEs. In this case, the innovation cost is also taken into account for
considering the eciency. It should be examined whether ecient diusion
can be achieved in these cases. However, these extensions make the model
complex, so we remain these problems for future research.
Appendix: proof of Theorem 1
This appendix is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.
Dene a partition ( k)
n2
k=1 of
  such that
 k = fG(S;z)(T )j njSj   jT j+ 1 = kg for each k = 1; :::; n2:
Note that this partition does not satisfy Denition 2(a) as shown in Propo-
sition 3, but it will be useful in the following proofs. For each position
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G(S;z)(T ), dene
 (G(S;z)(T )) =
[
njSj jT j+1<kn2
 k:
Throughout the following proofs, we employ these notations.
Preceding to the proof of Theorem 1, we state and prove three lemmas.
Lemmas 2 and 3 prove properties that frequently appear in the subsequent
lemmas.
Lemma 2 Let  = (S; z) 2  with S 6= N . Let T 2 N (S) with S [ T = N
and
P
i2T fi(N) >
P
i2T fi(S). Then, there exists some (N; y) 2 X(G(T ))
such that fi(N) + yi > fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T and yi  zi for all i 2 S \ T .
Proof. Fix an arbitrary  = (S; z) 2  with S 6= N . Let T 2 N (S) with
S[T = N andPi2T fi(N) >Pi2T fi(S). Dene i = fi(N) fi(S) for each
i 2 T . Dene
" = min

fiji 2 S \ Tg [
P
i2T i
jT j

;
"0 =
P
i2T i   jS \ T j"
jT n Sj :
Note that " > 0 since i > 0 for all i 2 S \ T by Assumption 1(a), andP
i2T i =
P
i2T fi(N) 
P
i2T fi(S) > 0. Note also that "
0 > 0 by
X
i2T
i   jS \ T j" 
X
i2T
i

1  jS \ T jjT j

> 0;
where the last strict inequality follows from T n S 6= ;, which is due to
S [ T = N and S 6= N . Dene
yi =
8><>:
zi   i + " if i 2 S \ T
zi   i + "0 if i 2 T n S
zi if i 2 N n T:
(6)
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Then, (N; y) 2 X(G(T )) by (6) and
X
i2T
yi =
X
i2T
zi  
X
i2T
i + jS \ T j"+
 X
i2T
i   jS \ T j"
!
=
X
i2T
zi:
By " > 0 and "0 > 0, fi(N) + yi > fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T . Further, yi  zi
for all i 2 S \ T by "  i for all i 2 S \ T . 
Lemma 3 Let  be an SB for a TPET-RIA situation (;  ). Let  = (S; z) 2
 with S 6= N . Let T 2 N (S) with S [ T = N . Assume that
(G) satises Theorem 1 for any G 2  (G(T )): (7)
(a) For any (R; x) 2 X(G(T )) with fi(R) + xi  fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T ,
(R; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) for all Q  T n S and all Q  T with
S [Q 6= N .
(b) For any (R; x) 2 X(G(T )) with fi(R)+xi < fi(S)+ zi for some i 2 T ,
(N; x) 2 ODOM(;G(T )).
(c) For any (R; x) 2 X(G(T )) with R 6= S;N , (R; x) 2 ODOM(;G(T )).
(d) For any (N; x) 2 X(G(T )) with fi(N) + xi  fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T ,
(N; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) for all Q  T if either (i) (G(T ))
satises Theorem 1 or (ii)  is an OSSB.
Proof. Let  be an SB for a TPET-RIA situation (;  ). Fix an arbitrary
 = (S; z) 2  with S 6= N and an arbitrary T 2 N (S) with S [ T = N .
Assume (7).
(a) Fix an arbitrary (R; x) 2 X(G(T )) with fi(R) + xi  fi(S) + zi
for all i 2 N . First, x an arbitrary Q  T n S. Then, fG(T n Q)g =
(QjG(T ); (R; x)). We have G(T nQ) 2  (G(T )) by jT nQj < jT j. Thus,
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(G(T n Q)) = f(S; z)g by (7). Therefore, (R; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) by
fi(R) + xi  fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T .
Next, x an arbitrary Q0  T with Q0 \ S 6= ; and Q0 [ S 6= N . Note
that Q0 ( T by S [ T = N . Then, G(Q0) 2  (G(T )) by jQ0j < jT j, and
(G(Q0)) = f(S; z)g by (7). Therefore, (R; x) =2 ODOMQ0(;G(T )) by
fi(R)+xi  fi(S)+zi for all i 2 Q0  T and fG(Q0)g = (Q0jG(T ); (R; x)).
(b) Let (R; x) 2 X(G(T )). Assume that there exists some k 2 T such
that fk(R) + xk < fk(S) + zk. First, assume k 2 S \ T . In this case,
fG(fkg)g = (fkgjG(T ); (N; x)). By jT j > 1, G(fkg) 2  (G(T )). Thus,
(G(fkg)) = f(S; z)g by k 2 S and (7). Hence (R; x) 2 ODOMfkg(;G(T )).
Next, assume k 2 TnS. In this case, fG(Tnfkg)g = (fkgjG(T ); (R; x)).
By jT nfkgj < jT j, G(T nfkg) 2  (G(T )). Thus, (G(T nfkg)) = f(S; z)g
by S [ (T n fkg) 6= N and (7). Hence (R; x) 2 ODOMfkg(;G(T )).
(c) Fix an arbitrary (R; y) 2 X(G(T )) with R 6= N and R 6= S. Then,
G(R;y)(N) 2  (G(T )) since njRj   n + 1 = (jRj   1)n + 1 > njSj   jT j + 1
by jRj > jSj and jT j > 0. Thus, (G(R;y)(N)) satises Theorem 1. Then,
we can nd some (N; y0) 2 (G(R;y)(N)) such that fi(N) + y0i > fi(R) + yi
for all i 2 N by Lemma 2, R 6= N , and Assumption 1(b). Hence (R; y) 2
ODOMN(;G(T )) since G(R;y)(N) 2 (N jG(T ); (R; y)) by R 6= S.
(d) Fix an arbitrary (N; x) 2 X(G(T )) with fi(N) + xi  fi(S) + zi
for all i 2 T . Assume that either (i) or (ii) holds. For all Q  T , G 2
(QjG(T ); (N; x)) implies either G = G(N;x)(Q) or G = G(T ), where the
latter takes place only if Q = T . If G = G(N;x)(Q), then for any (N; y) 2
X(G(N;x)(Q)), fj(N) + yj  fj(N) + xj for some j 2 Q. Thus, assume
G = G(T ).
Suppose that there exists some (R; y) 2 (G(T )) such that fi(R) + yi >
fi(N) + xi for all i 2 T . Then, either R = N or R = S by (i) itself if (i)
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holds, and by (c) of this lemma if (ii) holds. By (R; y); (N; x) 2 X(G(T )),P
i2T xi =
P
i2T yi =
P
i2T zi. Thus,
P
i2T fi(N) >
P
i2T fi(N) if R = N
since fi(R) + yi > fi(N) + xi for all i 2 T , and
P
i2T fi(S) >
P
i2T fi(S) if
R = S since fi(R)+yi > fi(N)+xi  fi(S)+zi for all i 2 T . A contradiction
occurs in each case. Hence (N; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) for all Q  T . 
Lemma 4, which follows, will be useful in the proofs of Theorem 1(c)-(e).
Lemma 4 Let  be an SB for a TPET-RIA situation (;  ). Let  = (S; z) 2
 with S 6= N , and T 2 N (S) with S [ T = N . Assume that
(G) satises Theorem 1 for any G 2  (G(T )): (8)
Further assume that either (i) (G(T )) satises Theorem 1 or (ii)  is an
OSSB.
(a) 
(N; x) 2 X(G(T ))
 xi  zi;8i 2 S \ T ;fi(N) + xi  fi(S) + zi; 8i 2 T

 X(G(T )) nODOM(;G(T ))
 f(N; x) 2 X(G(T ))jfi(N) + xi  fi(S) + zi; 8i 2 Tg [ f(S; z)g:
(b) If
P
i2T fi(N) >
P
i2T fi(S), then (S; z) 2 ODOM(;G(T )).
Proof. Let  be an SB for a TPET-RIA situation (;  ). Fix an arbitrary
 = (S; z) 2  with S 6= N , and an arbitrary T 2 N (S) with S [ T = N .
Assume (8) and that either (i) or (ii) holds.
(a) The latter inclusion immediately follows from Lemma 3(b) and (c).
Therefore, we turn to the proof of the former inclusion.
Fix an arbitrary (N; x) 2 X(G(T )) such that xi  zi for all i 2 T \S and
fi(N) + xi  fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T . Let Q 2 N . If (QjG(T ); (N; x)) 6= ;,
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then either Q  T n S, Q  T , or Q ( T with Q 2 N (S). If Q  T n S,
then (N; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) follows from Lemma 3(a). If Q  T , then
(N; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) follows from Lemma 3(d).
Assume, therefore, that Q ( T with Q 2 N (S). In this case, fG(Q)g =
(QjG(T ); (N; x)). If S [Q 6= N , then (N; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) follows
from Lemma 3(a). Therefore, assume that S [ Q = N . Suppose that there
exists some (R; y) 2 (G(Q)) such that fi(R)+yi > fi(N)+xi for all i 2 Q.
By jQj < jT j, G(Q) 2  (G(T )). Thus, either R = N or R = S by (8). If
R = S, then fi(S) + yi > fi(N) + xi  fi(S) + zi for all i 2 Q. Aggregating
these inequalities over Q,
P
i2Q fi(S) >
P
i2Q fi(S) by
P
i2Q yi =
P
i2Q zi.
This is a contradiction. Assume R = N . Then, yi > xi for all i 2 Q by
fi(N) + yi > fi(N) + xi for all i 2 Q. Note that S [ Q = N and Q ( T
imply T n Q  S \ T . Then, by xi  zi for all i 2 T n Q  S \ T andP
i2T xi =
P
i2T zi,X
i2Q
yi >
X
i2Q
xi 
X
i2Q
xi +
X
i2TnQ
(xi   zi) =
X
i2T
xi  
X
i2TnQ
zi =
X
i2Q
zi:
This contradicts (N; y) 2 X(G(Q)). Thus, (N; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )).
Hence (N; x) 2 X(G(T )) nODOM(;G(T )).
(b) Assume that
P
i2T fi(N) >
P
i2T fi(S). We have
(G(T )) 

(N; x) 2 X(G(T ))
 xi  zi; 8i 2 S \ T;fi(N) + zi  fi(S) + zi; 8i 2 T

by (i) itself if (i) holds, and by Lemma 4(a) if (ii) holds. Then, there exists
some (N; z0) 2 (G(T )) with fi(N)+ z0i > fi(S)+ zi for all i 2 T by Lemma
2 and
P
i2T fi(N) >
P
i2T fi(S). Hence (S; z) 2 ODOMT (;G(T )). 
Now, we turn to the proof of Theorem 1. It suces to show that (a)-(e)
are true since (5) immediately follows from (d).
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Proof of Theorem 1. Let  be an SB for a TPET-RIA situation (;  ).
Assume that either (i)  satises Theorem 1 or (ii)  is an OSSB. We prove
that for any G 2  , X(G) n ODOM(;G) coincides with the corresponding
one of the right-hand side of (a)-(e) of Theorem 1 provided that either (i) or
(ii) is satised. If (i) holds, then it is proved that  satisfying Theorem 1 is
an OSSB, and if (ii) holds, then its uniqueness is proved. The proof proceeds
by a reverse mathematical induction on  k, i.e. we prove Theorem 1 for any
G 2  k, assuming that the proof is done for any G0 2  (G).
We start with the induction base. Fix an arbitrary G 2  n2 . Then,
there exist some  = (N; z) 2  and i 2 N such that G = G(N;z)(fig).
It is straightforward that (N; z) =2 ODOM(;G(fig)) by X(G(fig)) =
f(N; z)g, (figjG(fig); (N; z)) = fG(fig)g, and (QjG(fig); (N; z)) = ;
for all Q 6= fig. Therefore, X(G(N;z)(fig)) nODOM(;G(fig)) = f(N; z)g.
Fix an arbitrary  = (S; z) 2  and an arbitrary T 2 N (S). Assume that
the proof is done for any G 2  (G(T )). Note that (G) satises Theorem 1
for any G 2  (G(T )) by (i) itself if (i) holds and by the induction hypothesis
if (ii) holds.
(a) Assume that S = N . If jT j = 1, then the proof is done as the
induction base. Therefore, assume that jT j > 1. Fix an arbitrary (N; x) 2
X(G(T )) such that x 6= z. Then, there exists some k 2 T such that xk < zk.
Note that (G(fkg)) = f(N; z)g by the induction hypothesis. Thus, we
obtain (N; x) 2 ODOMfkg(;G(T )) by G(fkg) 2 (fkgjG(T ); (N; x))
and (N; z) 2 (G(fkg)). Hence
X(G(T )) nODOM(;G(T ))  f(N; z)g: (9)
We turn to proving (N; z) =2 ODOM(;G(T )). Let Q 2 N . If G 2
(QjG(T ); (N; z)), then G = G(Q) and Q  T . If Q ( T , then G(Q) 2
 (G(T )). Thus, (N; z) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) since (G(Q)) = f(N; z)g by
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the induction hypothesis. If Q = T , then (N; z) =2 ODOMT (;G(T )) since
(G(T ))  f(N; z)g by (i) itself if (i) holds and by (9) if (ii) holds. There-
fore, (N; z) =2 ODOM(;G(T )). Hence X(G(T )) n ODOM(;G(T )) =
f(N; z)g.
(b) Assume that S 6= N and S [ T 6= N . First, x an arbitrary (R; x) 2
X(G(T )) such that R 6= S. Since njRj n+1 = n(jRj 1)+1 > njSj jT j+1
by jRj > jSj, (G(R;x)(N)) satises Theorem 1. Then, we can nd some
(N; x0) 2 (G(R;x)(N)) such that fi(N) + x0i > fi(R) + xi for all i 2 N by
Lemma 2 and Assumption 1(b). Thus, (R; x) 2 ODOMN(;G(T )) since
G(R;x)(N) 2 (N jG(T ); (R; x)).
Next, x an arbitrary (S; x) 2 X(G(T )) with x 6= z. Note that jT j > 1
if such (S; x) exists. Since njSj   jQj + 1 > njSj   jT j + 1 for any Q ( T ,
(G(Q)) = f(S; z)g for allQ ( T by (i) itself if (i) holds and by the induction
hypothesis if (ii) holds. By x 6= z and Pi2T xi =Pi2T zi, there exists some
k 2 T such that xk < zk. Assume k 2 S \ T . Then, (G(fkg)) = f(S; z)g
by fkg ( T , (i) itself if (i) holds, and the induction hypothesis if (ii) holds.
Thus, (S; x) 2 ODOMfkg(;G(T )) since G(fkg) 2 (fkgjG(T ); (S; x)).
Assume k 2 T n S. Then, (G(T n fkg)) = f(S; z)g by T n fkg ( T , (i)
itself if (i) holds, and the induction hypothesis if (ii) holds. Thus, (S; x) 2
ODOMfkg(;G(T )) since G(T n fkg) 2 (fkgjG(T ); (S; x)). Hence
X(G(T )) nODOM(;G(T ))  f(S; z)g: (10)
We turn to showing (S; z) =2 ODOM(;G(T )). By the construction of
, G 2 (QjG(T ); (S; z)) implies either G = G(T n Q) or G = G(Q).
First, assume that G = G(T n Q). Then, Q  T n S. Thus, G(T n Q) 2
 (G(T )) by jT n Qj < jT j, and (G(T n Q)) = f(S; z)g by (i) itself if
(i) holds and by the induction hypothesis if (ii) holds. Therefore, (S; z) =2
ODOMQ(;G(T )). Next, assume that G = G(Q). Then, Q  T . If
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Q 6= T , then G(Q) 2  (G(T )) by jQj < jT j. Thus, (G(Q)) = f(S; z)g by
the induction hypothesis, and (S; z) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )). Let Q = T . We
have (G(T ))  f(S; z)g by (i) itself if (i) holds, and by (10) if (ii) holds.
Thus, (S; z) =2 ODOMT (;G(T )). Hence X(G(T )) n ODOM(;G(T )) =
f(S; z)g.
(c) Assume that S 6= N , S [ T = N , and Pi2T fi(N) Pi2T fi(S). Fix
an arbitrary (N; x) 2 X(G(T )) such that fi(N) + xi = fi(S) + zi for all
i 2 T , which exists only if Pi2T fi(N) = Pi2T fi(S). By Assumption 1(a),
xi < zi for all i 2 S \ T . Then, (N; x) =2 ODOM(;G(T )) by Lemma 4(a).
Therefore, it suces to show that (S; z) =2 ODOM(;G(T )) by Lemma
4(a).
Let Q 2 N . If (QjG(T ); (S; z)) 6= ;, then either Q  N n S or Q 
T with Q 2 N (S) by the denition of . If Q  N n S, then (S; z) =2
ODOMQ(;G(T )) follows from Lemma 3(a). Assume that Q  T . Then,
fG(Q)g = (QjG(T ); (S; z)). We distinguish two cases. First, consider
the case with Q [ S 6= N . Then, (S; z) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) follows from
Lemma 3(a). Next, consider the case where Q [ S = N . In this case,
T n Q  S by Q  T . By Assumption 1(a), fi(S) < fi(N) for all i 2
T n Q  S. Thus, Pi2Q fi(N)  Pi2Q fi(S) by Pi2T fi(N)  Pi2T fi(S).
Then, (R; y) 2 (G(Q)) implies either (R; y) = (S; z) or R = N with
fi(N) + yi = fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T by (i) itself if (i) holds and by the
second inclusion of Lemma 4(a) and
P
i2Q fi(N) 
P
i2Q fi(S) if (ii) holds.
Therefore, (S; z) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )). Thus, (S; z) =2 ODOM(;G(T )).
Hence
X(G(T )) nODOM(;G(T ))
= f(N; x) 2 X(G(T ))jfi(N) + xi = fi(S) + zi; 8i 2 Tg [ f(S; z)g:
(d) Assume that S 6= N , S [ T = N , Pi2T fi(N) > Pi2T fi(S), and
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jS \ T j = 1. Fix an arbitrary (N; x) 2 X(G(T )) such that fi(N) + xi 
fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T and xk > zk where fkg = S \ T . It suces to show
(N; x) =2 ODOM(;G(T )) by Lemma 4(a) and (b).
Let Q 2 N . If (QjG(T ); (N; x)) 6= ;, then either Q  T n S, Q  T ,
or Q ( T with Q 2 N (S). If Q  T n S, then (N; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T ))
follows from Lemma 3(a). If Q  T , then (N; x) =2 ODOM(;G(T )) follows
from Lemma 3(d). Therefore, assume Q ( T with Q 2 N (S). In this case,
fG(Q)g = (QjG(T ); (N; x)). By jQj < jT j, G(Q) 2  (G(T )). By
jS \ T j = 1 and Q \ S 6= ;, Q [ S 6= N . Thus, (G(Q)) = f(S; z)g by
(i) itself if (i) holds and by the induction hypothesis if (ii) holds. Therefore,
(N; x) =2 ODOMQ(;G(T )) since fi(N) + xi  fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T .
Thus, (N; x) =2 ODOM(;G(T )). Hence
X(G(T )) nODOM(;G(T ))
=

(N; x) 2 X(G(T ))  fi(N) + zi  fi(S) + zi;8i 2 T 	 :
(e) Assume that S 6= N , S [ T = N , Pi2T fi(N) > Pi2T fi(S), and
jS \ T j > 1. Fix an arbitrary (N; x) 2 X(G(T )) such that fi(N) + xi 
fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T and there exists some k 2 S \ T with xk > zk. It
suces to show (N; x) 2 ODOM(;G(T )) by Lemma 4(a) and (b). We
distinguish the proof two cases.
Case 1.
P
i2(S\T )nfkg xi 
P
i2(S\T )nfkg zi.
Let h 2 argminfxj   zjj j 2 (S \ T ) n fkgg. If xh  zh, then xj  zj for
all j 2 (S \ T ) n fhg, and Pi2(S\T )nfhg xi > Pi2(S\T )nfhg zi by xk > zk. If
xh < zh, then (S \ T ) n fk; hg 6= ; and
P
i2(S\T )nfk;hg xi >
P
i2(S\T )nfk;hg zi.
Thus,
P
i2(S\T )nfhg xi >
P
i2(S\T )nfhg zi by xk > zk.
Dene " =
P
i2(S\T )nfhg(xi   zi) > 0 and
yi =
(
xi +
"
jTnSj+1 if i 2 fhg [ T n S,
zi otherwise.
(11)
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By (11) and
P
i2T xi =
P
i2T zi,X
i2fhg[(TnS)
yi =
X
i2fhg[(TnS)
xi + "
=
X
i2fhg[(TnS)
xi +
X
i2(S\T )nfhg
xi  
X
i2(S\T )nfhg
zi
=
X
i2T
xi  
X
i2(S\T )nfhg
zi
=
X
i2fhg[(TnS)
zi:
(12)
Thus, (N; y) 2 X(G(fhg [ (T n S))) by (11) and (12). By (11) and the
choice of (N; x), fi(N)+yi > fi(N)+xi  fi(S)+ zi for all i 2 fhg[ (T nS).
Denote R = fhg [ (T n S). Then, G(R) 2  (G(T )) by jRj = jT n Sj+ 1 <
jT n Sj+ jS \ T j = jT j. By (12),X
i2R
(fi(N)  fi(S)) =
X
i2R
(fi(N) + yi) 
X
i2R
(fi(S) + zi) > 0:
Therefore, (N; y) 2 (G(R)) by fi(N) + yi > fi(S) + zi for all i 2 R,
jR\ Sj = jfhgj = 1, (i) itself if (i) holds, and the induction hypothesis if (ii)
holds. By R  T and R \ S = fhg 6= ;, G(R) 2 (RjG(T ); (N; x)). Hence
(N; x) 2 ODOMR(;G(T )).
Case 2.
P
i2(S\T )nfkg xi <
P
i2(S\T )nfkg zi.
Let P = fi 2 S \ T jxi < zig. Note that P 6= ; and k =2 P . Dene
" =
P
i2(S\T )nP (xi   zi) and  = min

fzi   xiji 2 Pg [
n
"
jTnSj+jP j
o
. It is
easy to see that " > 0 as well as  > 0 by xk > zk and the denition of P .
Dene 0 = " jP jjTnSj . We have 
0 > 0 by P 6= ; and
"  jP j  "  jP j"jT n Sj+ jP j =
jT n Sj
jT n Sj+ jP j" > 0:
32
Further, dene
yi =
8><>:
xi +  if i 2 P
xi + 
0 if i 2 T n S
zi otherwise.
(13)
By (13) and
P
i2T xi =
P
i2T zi,X
i2P[(TnS)
yi =
X
i2P
yi +
X
i2TnS
yi
=
 X
i2P
xi + jP j
!
+
0@X
i2TnS
xi + ("  jP j)
1A
=
X
i2P[(TnS)
xi +
X
i2(S\T )nP
xi  
X
i2(S\T )nP
zi
=
X
i2T
xi  
X
i2(S\T )nP
zi
=
X
i2P[(TnS)
zi:
(14)
Then, (N; y) 2 X(G(P[(T nS))) by (13) and (14). We also have fi(N)+yi >
fi(N) + xi  fi(S) + zi for all i 2 P [ (T n S), and yi  zi for all i 2 P by
  zi xi for all i 2 P . Denote R0 = P [ (T nS). Then, G(R0) 2  (G(T ))
by jR0j = jP j + jT n Sj  j(S \ T ) n fkgj + jT n Sj < jT j. Moreover,P
i2R0(fi(N)  fi(S)) > 0 by (14) andX
i2R0
(fi(S) + zi) 
X
i2R0
(fi(N) + xi) <
X
i2R0
(fi(N) + yi):
Thus, (N; y) 2 (G(R0)) by (i) itself if (i) holds and by the induction hy-
pothesis if (ii) holds. We have G(R0) 2 (R0jG(T ); (N; x)) by R0  T and
R0 \ S = P 6= ;. Hence (N; x) 2 ODOMR0(;G(T )).
By Cases 1 and 2, (N; x) 2 ODOM(;G(T )).
Next, we show that (S; z) 2 ODOM(;G(T )). Note that
(G(T )) 

(N; x) 2 X(G(T ))
 xi  zi; 8i 2 S \ T;fi(N) + zi  fi(S) + zi; 8i 2 T

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by (i) itself if (i) holds and by Lemma 4(a) if (ii) holds. Then, we can nd
some (N; z0) 2 (G(T )) such that fi(N) + z0i > fi(S) + zi for all i 2 T by
Lemma 2 and
P
i2T fi(N) >
P
i2T fi(S). Thus, (S; z) 2 ODOM(;G(T )).
Hence
X(G(T )) nODOM(;G(T ))
=

(N; x) 2 X(G(T ))
 xi  zi;8i 2 S \ T;fi(N) + zi  fi(S) + zi;8i 2 T

:

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